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The role of physics may be more limited here than Bird would like
to allow. Does physics really make claims about the dispositionality –
or otherwise – of properties? CM will take talk of dispositions and
powers (and ‘dynamical properties’) to be made true by objects with
categorical properties and their relations to laws involving categorical
properties. It will say that characterising a property dispositionally
says nothing about its ultimate nature. But if so, how great a role
can physics play when choosing between CM, MV and DM?
Fortunately Bird has already shown DE to be a better theory than
CM. As for the choice between MV and DM, perhaps all that can
be said is that inasmuch as DM takes all fundamental properties to
be potencies, it is simpler and so – if all else is equal – the theory to
be preferred.
Bird’s exploration and defence of Dispositionalism is impressive.
It is detailed, meticulously constructed and insightful, and should
do a great deal to persuade philosophers of the position’s plausibility.
The book is a demanding but very illuminating read.
Simon Bostock
Newton as Philosopher
By Andrew Janiak
Cambridge University Press, 2008, £45 / $90
ISBN 978-0-521-86286-8
doi:10.1017/S0031819109990532
Newton’s philosophy of natural science has been at the very heart of
an important literature in history and philosophy of science, going
back to A. Koyre´’s Newtonian Studies in 1968, R. Westfall’s and
I. Bernard Cohen’s monographs in the 70s and 80s (among many
other authoritative studies, including Henry Guerlac, He´le`ne
Metzger, and more recently George Smith, Howard Stein, and
Robert DiSalle). This is an overcrowded ﬁeld, where ﬁnding a new
historical angle or developing a new philosophical analysis – while
standing on the shoulders of such giants – may prove a daunting
task. Andrew Janiak’s new book Newton as Philosopher fulﬁls the
task successfully, and proves the good that can come from combining
a historically accurate accountwith a philosophically compelling analy-
sis. In the space of 178pp. Janiak masterfully steers his interpretive
analysis through an extraordinarily rich historical material, while the
philosophically rigorous narrative takes the reader from one chapter
to the next in a compelling way. The ﬁnal result is a brilliant book
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that has an important story to tell about Newton’s ‘physical metaphy-
sics’, and it makes it an occasion for a thousand wider meditations.
The book articulates an interpretation of Newton that programma-
tically takes the distance from two inﬂuential views: (a) one contend-
ing that Newton eschewed the metaphysical issues underlying
Descartes’ metaphysical physics, to focus only on empirical and
mathematical topics; and (b) the other (defended by Stein and
DiSalle, more recently) claiming that Newton did not eschew meta-
physical issues, but instead transformed a priori issues (e.g. causa-
tion) into empirical ones. While the ﬁrst anti-metaphysical reading
of Principia seems to ﬁnd support in Newton’s mathematical treat-
ment of forces, and in his causal agnosticism – i.e. ‘attraction’ does
notmean ‘physical cause’, hence Newton’s methodological hypothesis
non ﬁngo – ; the second interpretation, by contrast, claims that
Newton did not simply reject Descartes, Leibniz or Huygens’ mech-
anical philosophy. Instead, he refused to speculate about what the
physical basis of gravity, simply because he believed that gravity
acted directly between bodies across empty space, and defended a
non-mechanical view of causation.
Against both these interpretations, Janiak sets out to defend an
alternative interpretation, based on a ‘physical metaphysics’ (as
opposed to Descartes’ ‘metaphysical physics’, whereby God is meta-
physically and epistemically prior to physics). This third interpret-
ation is based on a partial acceptance of Stein–DiSalle second
interpretation: when it comes to mundane metaphysics (e.g.
whether there are forces, how they act, and whether or not there is
causation in nature), Newton transformed some a priori issues into
empirical ones. But mundane metaphysics was part and parcel of a
broader framework, including divine metaphysics, which while not
subject to the methods of empirical investigation was at the same
time an integral part of natural philosophy, as Newton clearly
declared in the General Scholium to the second edition of Principia
(1713): ‘to treat of God from phenomena is certainly a part of
natural philosophy’. Against DiSalle, Janiak claims that Newton
never endorsed gravity as action at a distance between bodies in
empty space, and that this was indeed germane to God’s relation to
space as spelled out in the General Scholium, whereby absolute
space becomes the expression of God’s omnipresence in nature.
To support this third interpretation, Janiak has to demonstrate that
(1) gravity is to be understood as local and yet non-mechanical; and
(2) that Newton’s methodology is very different from the mechanical
philosophers’ one: his rejection of action at a distance never led him to
underwrite a hypothesis concerning the ‘cause of gravity’; nor did he
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feign or endorse hypotheses, including his own ether hypothesis in
the Queries of Opticks. Chapters 3 and 4 of Janiak’s monograph are
dedicated to spell out these two main points.
To prove that (1) gravity is to be understood as local and yet non-
mechanical, in ch. 3 Janiak distinguishes between ‘strict mechanism’
and ‘loose mechanism’ (52). The former is Cartesian in claiming that
all changes in nature occur through impact among material bodies
with a certain size, shape and motion. The latter is Leibnizian in
introducing forces but claiming that natural changes cannot occur
via action at a distance. The mechanical philosophers, especially
Leibniz in his 1689 Tentamen, posed then the following dilemma to
Newton: either his notion of ‘gravity’ is unacceptable because it
implies action at a distance; or, in order to avoid action at a distance,
he had to deny gravity too.
But, pace Leibniz, Janiak argues that Newton could escape the
dilemma and believe in the real existence of gravity, while also reject-
ing action at a distance as ‘inconceivable’ (both in his 1693 correspon-
dence with Bentley, and in the General Scholium). Newton could
defend gravity as local while escaping any mechanical conclusion –
i.e. any vortex theory of gravity like the one developed by Leibniz
in Tentamen – because, by contrast with Leibniz and other mechan-
ical philosophers, he did not conﬂate local action with surface action.
In Janiak’s words: ‘According to the overarching view that Newton
would attribute to Leibniz, a cause must involve some mechanism –
it must be “mechanical” – in the following two senses: (I) the cause
cannot alter the state of motion of any material body at a spatial dis-
tance from it; and (2) it cannot alter the state ofmotion of anymaterial
body without impacting on one or more surfaces of that body. . .
Newton’s imagined physical theory of gravity based on the ether in
query 21 of Opticks involves an acceptance of (1) but a rejection of
(2) for the ether would act on bodies by ‘penetrating’ them’ (76).
So, Newton left open the empirical question of whether or not
there could be a future physical theory of gravity, but he also made
it clear that such theory could not take the form of Leibniz’s ﬂuid-
vortex theory, and must involve instead some form of pervasive
ether. In sum, Janiak defends the view that Newton’s ether – as a
possible medium of gravity – would guarantee local action, and yet
be non-mechanical in the sense that it would not involve surface
action, but would instead ﬂow through material bodies and interact
directly with their masses. Thus, by contrast with Westfall, who in
Force in Newton’s Physics (American Elsevier, 1971) famously
argued that Newton introduced the brand new concept of force to
the ontology of nature, Janiak argues that the brand new concept
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Newton introduced was instead mass, not force. Mass, and mass
alone, is salient for gravity; and to prove this point Janiak turns to
Cotes’ preface to the second edition of Principia.
Roger Cotes, astronomer at Trinity College, Cambridge, wrote
a famous preface where he defended Newtonian gravity from the
accusation of being an occult quality and hailed it as a universal
quality of all bodies. But Newton begged to differ. For Newton,
gravity could not be a primary universal quality, because (i) it
diminishes with the distance (unlike mass, extension, impenetrability
that do not increase or diminish with the distance), and (ii) it may well
be a property of the ether or of some other medium. Thus, while
playing down the role of gravity as a primary universal quality,
Newton effectively introduced a brand new concept of mass, which –
according to Janiak – marked the real novelty compared to the
previous mechanical philosophy.
For Descartes, the ‘quantity of matter’ (or mass) involved only
extension: the world was a plenum and any material body was
extended and characterised by size, shape, and motion. For
Newton, in addition to extension, quantity of matter involves the
density of the extended body. Moreover, for Newton, we can learn
the mass of a body by weighing it, although mass and weight are dis-
tinct. Indeed, Newton introduced a key distinction between inertial
and gravitational mass, which was absent in Descartes, and had two
important effects: (I) it could account for Galileo’s discovery that
all bodies fall with the same acceleration; (II) it allowed to obtain
mass from weight deﬁned as resistance of a body to acceleration,
and, as such, mass became a measurable quantity.
Janiak concludes then that for Newton the essence of matter is
mass, not the force of gravity, which is in turn deﬁned in terms of
mass. So, gravity is not an occult quality because it is proportional
to mass, and mass is ultimately a measurable quantity. Most impor-
tantly, this brand new Newtonian concept of mass is congenial to
an epistemology of material objects, according to which we cannot
ascribe properties a priori, as with Descartes’ res extensa. Instead,
the properties of matter have to be deﬁned via experiments and
via the concepts of a physical theory (e.g. via Newton’s second law
that deﬁnes the concept of weight as resistance to gravitational
acceleration).
To sum up, according to Janiak, Newton’s non-mechanical con-
ception of causation – i.e. there can be local action that does not
involve impact or surface action among material bodies – is
germane to his non-mechanical ontology, whereby matter is non-
mechanical in the speciﬁc sense clariﬁed above. The question
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remains as to whether there is a medium (ether or other) as the ‘phys-
ical cause’ of gravitational interaction among bodies.
This last point leads ﬁnally Janiak’s discussion towards the
problem of absolute space. InDe gravitatione (an unpublished manu-
script written most probably before the 1678 Principia) Newton
defended the thesis that space is an affection of being – be it God,
humanminds, or material bodies – because any being exists by occu-
pying a certain space and a certain time, including human minds (by
contrast with Descartes’ res cogitans, which is not extended in space).
Thus, space and time are affections of all beings, including God; and
since God exists always and everywhere, space and time exist always
and everywhere, but they exist uncaused – as opposed to being efﬁ-
ciently caused by God. In other words, they exist contingently,
because their existence depends on the existence of something
else (bodies, mind, or God); but they are notionally distinct
from the entity whose existence their existence depends on. Hence,
space and time are affections, as opposed to substances that
would exist even if nothing existed (hence, the expression ‘substan-
tivalism’ to refer to Newton’s view of space and time is potentially
misleading).
But how is it possible to reconcile the affection thesis of De gravi-
tatione with Newton’s later claim in the Scholium to Principia that
space and time exist independently of all other things? Janiak men-
tions two possible readings of Newton’s absolute space and time:
(a) strong absolutism, space and time exist independently of every
entity, including God; and (b) weak absolutism i.e. space and time
exist independently of all material objects, but depend only on God
for their existence. Weak absolutism is compatible with De gravita-
tione, and also with the famous discussion of God and space in the
General Scholium of the second edition of Principia (1713). Most
importantly, Newton’s weak absolutism is congenial to his view of
natural philosophy as including the study of God, which is the
topic of the last chapter of Janiak’s book.
In the ﬁnal chapter, Janiak clariﬁes why Newton did not regard
physics as logically prior to metaphysics: he claims that Newton’s
physical theory did not in fact provide any compelling reason to
reject action at a distance, nor did it provide any compelling reason
for thinking of space as absolute (in the strong or weak sense).
According to Janiak, Newton never regarded the possibility of
action at a distance as empirical, and his understanding of action,
like his understanding of God’s place in the physical world, is
instead part of a metaphysical framework that is not subject to revi-
sion through the development of empirical science.
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Newton’s God is spatiotemporally ubiquitous and actively omni-
present. Admitting action at a distance would have forced Newton
to re-think God as acting non-locally, and hence would have
removed one of the main reasons for thinking God as spatiotem-
porally ubiquitous. It is this overarching metaphysical framework
that – according to Janiak’s interpretive analysis – ultimately
explains some of Newton’s controversial views about gravity, mass,
space, and time. Newton’s metaphysics concerns the same type of
substances that physics is concerned with: spatiotemporally local
substances – whether ﬁnite or inﬁnite, contingent or necessary. But
this overarching metaphysical framework, i.e. the study of God as
part of natural philosophy, is not itself physical, nor is it subject to
revision in the light of empirical evidence.
The doubt remains as to whether God’s omnipresence, via spatio-
temporal ubiquity, should necessarily be understood and construed
in non-mechanical terms, as Janiak consistently argues throughout
the book. After all, asWestfall noted,Newton’s spatiotemporally ubi-
quitous God, like his all-pervasive ether of theOpticks, were meant to
provide, respectively, a non-material and a material medium for the
locality of gravity. Indeed, while the ether – on which Newton had
abundantly speculated in some of the still largely Cartesian
(pre-Principia) unpublished manuscripts – was ofﬁcially absent in
the ﬁrst edition of Principia (1687) andOpticks (1704), it re-appeared
in their second editions. In particular, it re-appeared in the General
Scholium appended to the second edition of Principia (1713), and
in the new Queries attached to the second English edition of
Opticks (1717) to explain electricity, magnetism, optical phenomena,
and gravity, among others.
Westfall (op. cit., 395) ventured an explanation of this resurrection
of the ether: ‘[Newton] introduced the ether to provide a mechanical
explanation of forces which had appeared so occult to a generation
raised on the mechanical philosophy’, although ‘composed of par-
ticles repelling each other, the ether embodied the very problem of
action at a distance which it pretended to explain’. Newton’s ambigu-
ity on the ether can be explained by bearing in mind that there was
another candidate in Newton’s natural philosophy for the semi-
mechanical and semi-dynamical role of the ether, namely God
himself as an ‘incorporeal ether who could move bodies without
offering resistance to them in turn’ (ibid., 397), which is perfectly
germane to Newton’s idea of space and time as the sensorium of God.
Thus, while onWestfall’s reading, Newton rejected themechanical
philosophers’ accusation of gravity being an occult quality by playing
their own game and introducing a semi-mechanical explanation of
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gravity in terms of a (material or immaterial) medium; on Janiak’s
alternative reading, Newton’s rejected the accusation by showing
that gravity is reducible to mass, and mass in turn is a measurable
quantity. Of course, whether or not there are semi-mechanical resi-
dues in Newton’s natural philosophy depends on how we deﬁne
mechanical philosophy and what counts as ‘mechanism’ or ‘mechan-
ical cause’; and this remains an open issue, as Janiak himself seems to
acknowledge.1 The price that Janiak has to pay for his thorough going
non-mechanical interpretation of Newton’s natural philosophy con-
sists in playing down the concept of gravitational force with the
ensuing problem of its ‘physical basis’, in favour of mass.
Interpretive nuances notwithstanding, the ﬁnal picture that
Janiak’s monograph delivers is the picture of a Newton, whose phys-
ical speculations about gravity and mass and life-long polemic with
Cartesian and Leibnizian mechanical philosophy, are part and
parcel of an overarching metaphysical view of God’s role in nature.
Far from eschewing metaphysical issues or transforming them into
empirical ones, Janiak’s Newton sheds new light on the vexed issue
of the relationship between Newton’s physics and his metaphysical
and religious beliefs, and on how the latter informed and illuminated
the former. As such, Janiak’s monograph offers an essential contri-
bution to the ever-growing ﬁeld of history and philosophy of
science, and proves once more what can be achieved by masterfully
integrating intellectual history of science with philosophy.
Michela Massimi
1 For example, the historian Robert E. Schoﬁeld (Mechanism and mate-
rialism. British Natural Philosophy in an age of Reason, Princeton University
Press, 1970, 15) offers a different deﬁnition of mechanical philosophy:
‘From the dynamic corpuscolarity of the early Principia and the ﬁrst two
editions of the Opticks, historically evolving from the mechanical philos-
ophy of the seventeenth century, came the conviction of the mechanists
that causation for all the phenomena of nature was ultimately to be sought
in the primary particles. . . the various sizes and shapes of possible combi-
nations of these particles, . . . and the forces of attraction and repulsion
between them.’ Given this deﬁnition, Newton’s dynamic corpuscolarity,
i.e. his view that matter consists of corpuscles endowed with attractive and
repulsive forces, originated from and, in turn, engendered a mechanical
view of nature – very different from the Cartesian one – which nonetheless
played a key role in the development of British and Dutch natural philos-
ophy in the eighteenth century.
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